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Abstract 
 
In this paper we discuss the ease with which email 
can be used to breach confidence by the propagation of 
corporate secrets and intelligence, and propose an 
intelligent filtering system for outgoing emails aimed 
at preventing disclosures.  We report on a number of 
experiments undertaken with a corpus of over half a 
million Enron emails and the use of a variety of 
techniques from the field of Corpus Linguistics for 
reducing the number of false alarms produced by naïve 
keyword filtering systems, and discuss the results in 
detail. We also give due consideration to the danger of 
missing messages that should have been prevented 
from propagation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary describes 
Intellectual Property as a “general name for property 
(such as patents, trademarks, and copyright material) 
which is the product of invention or creativity, and 
which does not exist in a tangible, physical form”.  
Legal protection for intellectual property or the 
expression thereof emerges in the form of copyright, 
designs, patents and trade marks.  These variously 
protect literature, music, films, the visual appearance 
of a product, technical and functional aspects, and 
signs associated to products, goods and services.  
Further, lesser-known, forms of IP also exist, and 
receive protection in some form, including plant 
varieties.  The key to this form of protection is the 
existence of a trace of the IP in documentary form, for 
example the copyrighted article, or the patent 
application.   
Early knowledge management literature focused on 
knowledge as processes, on the ability to convert 
between “tacit” and “explicit” forms of the known, and 
on storing knowledge within, and extracting 
knowledge from, corporate databases [1], [2], [3].  
Policies, processes, and indeed software, played 
various supporting roles in allowing the propagation of 
“knowledge” around an organization.  The intellectual 
property, perhaps knowledge assets, of an organization 
could, if such claims were to be believed, be captured 
and transformed to the benefit of the business.  
Knowledge management, it appears, was aimed at 
managing all of what a company “knows”, from client 
lists to customer relationships to business processes to 
trade secrets.  The law of confidentiality applies to 
ensuring that these high-value collections remain 
known only to the organization, and are not disclosed 
to others in ways that would cause harm to the 
organization or benefit to its competitors.  Breach of 
confidence tends to make headlines when a disaffected 
employee, or ex-employee, purposely discloses such 
corporate property to the public at large or to 
competitor organizations. 
In this paper we consider the potential for breaches 
of confidence to occur rapidly and on a large scale, and 
the difficulty of preventing such disclosures of, in 
some cases, corporate intellectual property, by 
employees using email systems.  If employees are 
easily able to distribute the company’s secrets around 
the world in a few seconds by email, or perhaps by 
other insecure electronic means1, all other mechanisms 
used to secure this information are immediately 
rendered redundant.  Our goal is an intelligent and 
adaptive filtering system for outgoing emails that 
prevents disclosure of information deemed confidential 
or otherwise expected to have limited distribution.  
Such a system should also be capable of ensuring that 
outgoing emails are unlikely to contain information 
that would otherwise be detrimental to the 
organization, and perhaps of ensuring that corporate 
                                                        
1 USB memory sticks, as the US military discovered, provide yet 
another information security issue: http://tinyurl.com/22fayq  
policies preventing the personal use of email are being 
correctly adhered to.   
We discuss a number of initial experiments we have 
undertaken with the University of Surrey’s System 
Quirk text analysis software (Section 2.1) and the 
Enron email corpus (Section 2.2), a collection of 
emails released into the public domain by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission.  We explore the use 
of a number of analytical techniques from the field of 
Corpus Linguistics for reducing the number of false 
triggers, with due consideration given to the truly 
harmful false negatives – messages that should be 
caught but are not.  On the basis of our analysis, we 
propose that a system capable of capturing and 
preventing harmful disclosures would best be 
integrated with email clients to prevent propagation to 
the email distribution system in the first place.  
However, we are aware of the risk that this poses: such 
a system potentially provides an immediate back-door 
to specific knowledge, or perhaps intelligence, held 
elsewhere in the organization that the email user would 
not normally be privileged to.  Little appears to have 
been published, outside of corporate pamphlets and 
legal advice2 on this subject and available techniques 
and their accuracy, and we’ve found no direct 
consideration of the problem of false positives raised 
due to confidentiality banners.   
 
2. Background 
 
Email filters are normally concerned with ensuring 
that emails are free from viruses, worms and other 
forms of system attacks, and with preventing the 
acceptance or propagation of spam and latterly of 
phishing attacks. Secure transmission of emails to 
trusted sites using both encryption and all of the above 
filters has also been discussed, and even patented3.  
The ready accessibility of spam filtering systems 
means that companies are implementing them at the 
same time that spammers are using them to create 
emails that successfully pass through the filters, and 
variations of words that include misspellings and the 
incorporation of “foreign” characters or numbers can 
be used that remain generally readable, e.g. vïagara.  
Keyword-based approaches to spam filtering are 
defeated, also, by the incorporation of text into images 
[4].  Collaborative filtering [5], where a group of users 
effectively “vote out” emails as spam by adding these 
emails to a central database, have proven variously 
successful.  Such techniques, combined with white-
lists and black-lists, Bayesian filtering [6], [7], [8], and 
a host of other predictive and classificatory techniques, 
                                                        
2 http://tinyurl.com/2spz4n  
3 USPTO 6,609,196: http://tinyurl.com/26koxg  
produce varying degrees of successes in prevention of 
incoming email.  One can but marvel at the game-
playing approach and the continued inventiveness of 
the spammers.   
For outgoing emails, we are making an assumption 
that users are, more often than not, only involved in 
unintentional disclosure.  Arguably, therefore a 
keyword-based approach should be effective, and there 
are many commercial offerings which provide security 
features for outgoing emails, and the majority of these 
are incoming mail guards used in a different 
orientation.  However, while a simple keyword 
filtering approach may be helpful on a small scale, the 
keyword “confidential” used as a filter will result in a 
large number of false triggers or false positives since 
the advent of confidentiality banners.  These banners 
also contain other potential triggers – privileged; 
attorney; intended recipient – and a “whole-text” 
keyword-only blocking approach becomes expensive.  
Email responses containing a full quote of the original 
email, including the banner or perhaps several other 
banners, serve only to increase the frequency catch and 
compound the difficulty.  The human efforts involved 
in releasing all such emails captured on the basis of a 
list of keywords alone can be substantial in large 
organizations.  This is before we consider the potential 
waste of email archive space due to the profligate use 
of these banners.  To properly assess whether these 
captured emails contain confidential information, those 
involved in allowing their release would have to have 
extensive knowledge of, or access to, all of the 
confidential material.  The logical conclusion would be 
that an all-knowing group of humans would have to 
know or have access to all of the knowledge and 
intelligence within an organization, and to read, 
understand and allow or deny each and every piece of 
email traffic - a somewhat expensive, and likely error-
prone, process and likely to lead to substantial, if not 
insurmountable, delays in communication.  Computers 
are much faster at such processing, if the processing 
engine is well formulated and tested, however 
packaging up all of the organization’s knowledge and 
intelligence into a system near the edges of the 
company firewall may not a desirable approach. 
We expect our eventual solution to draw together 
work in a variety of areas, including but not limited to 
corpus linguistics and its subtopics of sentiment 
analysis, text segmentation, text classification, text 
mining, topic identification and analysis of register 
variation.   Consideration will be made, also, of 
machine learning algorithms, feature selection and 
binary classification tasks undertaken elsewhere.  We 
are well-placed, also, for making the all-important 
considerations regarding systems and security. 
 
2.1. Analytical Software: System Quirk 
 
System Quirk is a package of software for tasks 
such as text analysis, ontology learning, and 
terminology and text management.  A subset of these 
applications is freely available at the University of 
Surrey’s website4.  System Quirk provides software 
that implements a variety of analytical techniques from 
the field of corpus linguistic analysis, from simple 
frequency counts to keyword-in-context (KWIC) to 
statistical analyses of distance-based co-occurrence and 
to contrastive analysis with reference corpora 
producing so-called “weirdness” values [9].  In this 
paper, we demonstrate results from the use of a variety 
of these techniques, validated previously across a range 
of domains from nanotechnology to automotive 
engineering to financial trading [10], [11].  We 
augment these techniques with others developed in the 
course of our work and more specific to the task at 
hand. 
 
2.2. Dataset: The Enron email corpus 
 
The Enron email dataset5 consists of the email 
folders of 158 Enron employees, providing a total of 
619,446 emails [12].  The history of Enron and its fall 
from 7th largest company in the US, a highly regulated 
financial environment, to and “off balance sheet” 
losses and bankruptcy in 2001 has been well 
documented.  The Enron story demonstrated, at least, 
that having a code of ethics was one thing, but abiding 
by it was clearly another.  As part of the investigations 
into Enron, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission released a collection of 1.5m emails into 
the public domain, reportedly so that the public would 
be able to see the evidence forming part of the 
investigation. The discrepancy in number of emails is 
down to certain “data cleansing” activities undertaken 
elsewhere, including the deletion of messages "as part 
of a redaction effort due to requests from affected 
employees".  The remaining dataset still demonstrates 
a large range of the social interactions undertaken 
using email, including as it does messages within the 
organization, with other organizations, with friends and 
family, and sometimes containing material that would 
be unsuited for lower age groups.  It is worth 
remembering, also, that a number of these employees 
were not complicit in the fraudulent activities of Enron. 
 
                                                        
4 Available at: http://www.computing.surrey.ac.uk/SystemQ/ 
5 Available at: http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~enron/  
3. Approach 
 
With any approach to (artificially) intelligent 
processing, the most important factor is the choice of 
heuristic: it should represent value for information 
gain, be easy to implement and make effective use of 
the information elements.  The intention of our present 
efforts is to construct and implement an algorithm that 
identifies and discounts confidentiality banners.  Our 
initial efforts, therefore, concern determining whether a 
pattern of such banners can be learnt.   Our approach 
involves: 
1. Constructing a test dataset by “eyeballing” a small 
number of confidentiality banners and 
identifications of confidentiality in the Enron 
corpus  
2. Identifying an initial set of similarities that enable 
a skilled human to make a binary decision.  
3. Using the System Quirk software to determine 
whether the similarities have any statistical 
significance, using word frequency, word 
weirdness and word frequency/proximity 
statistical analysis on a training set 
4. Evaluating the approach against the full Enron 
corpus. 
5. Classifying emails as containing confidentiality 
indicators in (a) unseen banners; (b) body text; (c) 
both.  
6. Constructing a confidentiality banner database for 
further evaluation. 
7. Assessing the email corpus for further features, 
e.g. personal vs. business emails as may be 
discernible by register variation. 
For the purpose of this paper, we are concerned 
with steps 1-5. The “obvious” human choices for 
keywords and similarities (steps 1-2) are not 
necessarily the best, and proper statistical analysis can 
reveal easier and better patterns to exploit, a point well 
made elsewhere [13].   
 
4. Experiments 
 
A training set containing 50 unique banners and 46 
body paragraphs (each with at least one instance of the 
word “confidential”) was created manually by 
“eyeballing” a number of emails.  Similarities in the 
use of words such as “privileged” at a short distance 
from the keyword “confidential” were initially noted.  
We performed word frequency analysis, with and 
without stop words, and calculated values for 
“weirdness” using the British National Corpus (BNC) 
to identify and contrast prevalent keywords in the 
“banner” and “body” test sets.  Table 1 shows the top 
10 keywords discovered for each: there are some 
indications of difference, given the spreads of 
frequency values in these top 10s, and note that 
“privileged” is shared between these sets, albeit at a 
greater frequency in the banners. 
 
Table 1: Top 10 keywords discovered in body 
and in banner paragraphs   
Keywords: Body Keywords: Banners 
Freq Weirdness Word Freq Weirdness Word 
64 2763 confidential 68 969 mail 
22 inf! enron 66 288 intended 
9 456 transportation 51 1925 confidential 
8 1022 confidentiality 46 1494 recipient 
8 258 agreements 32 inf! email 
8 228 privileged 32 798 privileged 
7 inf! ferc 30 1581 sender 
7 7456 ena 29 2700 prohibited 
7 677 disclosure 28 245 error 
7 20 non 27 1178 delete 
 
Next we calculated frequencies of words within a 5 
word window of the keyword “confidential” across the 
whole Enron corpus (209,204,013 tokens, according to 
System Quirk computations) and compared this to the 
extracted banners.  Consider, for example, occurrences 
of “privileged” within this 5 word window – in the 
Enron corpus, “confidential” occurs 35621 times.  The 
word “privileged” occurs 19390 times within 5 words 
either side of this.  Of these 19390 times, it occurs 
6599 times at one word separated from confidential (at 
position 2, e.g. “confidential X privileged”).  A further 
4780 occurrences are opposite to this (“privileged X 
confidential”).  See Table 2.  Further details about the 
statistical significance of these values can be found in 
[14] 
 
Table 2: Frequencies of the word “privileged” 
within a window of 5 words of “confidential” 
Position -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5
Frequency 68 13 1375 4780 1647 71 6599 2593 1398 846
 
The extent to which the 35621 instances of 
“confidential” denote a banner can be assessed by 
contrasting the totals of collocating frequencies with 
the frequency analysis of the eyeballed banners (Table 
3).  The top 22 words collocating with “confidential” 
are indexed by the first column.  These indexes are 
used in brackets after the identical words found in the 
lists generated by frequency and weirdness 
calculations.  Differences in ranking due to frequency 
and weirdness calculations can be seen by alphabetic 
indexes.  According to these results, a relatively large 
proportion of the instances of “confidential” appear to 
be indicative of banners, though the true extent remains 
to be assessed.   
To confirm that the Enron corpus was statistically 
similar across email account names and that the Banner 
training selection was a representative sample, we 
performed a proximity (+/-5 words to confidential) 
frequency analysis across 60 million tokens of the raw 
corpus and then compared the top 22 words of the 
results to the top 22 words from the banner training 
sample for frequency and weirdness.  The impact of 
stemming and lexical variation remains to be assessed. 
 
Table 3: Banner/raw corpus sample 
Proximity raw Corpus  
frequency 
Banner  
By Frequency 
Banner  
By weirdness 
1 privileged 8122 information (3) 68 email (10) inf!
2 contain 4902 mail (a) 68 dissemination 2793
3 information 4722 intended (8) 66 prohibited (c) 2700
4 material 2818 message (11) 61 attachments (22) 2123
5 affiliate 2318 recipient (19) 46 sender (b) 1581
6 relevant 2305 please 45 disclosure (i) 1523
7 legally 1837 email (10) 32 recipient (19) 1494
8 intended 1594 privileged (1) 32 notify (f) 1077
9 proprietary 1340 sender (b) 30 delete (e) 1178
10 email 1185 received 30 mail (a) 969
11 message 1078 prohibited (c) 29 copying (g) 945
12 exempt 1075 error (d) 28 privileged (1) 798
13 otherwise 952 delete (e) 27 addressee 340
14 subject 947 immediately 27 intended (8) 288
15 enron.com 750 notify (f) 27 error (d) 245
16 contains 726 copying (g) 22 solely (18) 229
17 communication 684 other 21 strictly 197
18 solely 622 distribution 20 contained 98
19 recipient 612 contain (2) 19 contain (2) 95
20 protected 606 attachments (22) 19 copy 77
21 e-mail 592 communication (17) 19 contains (16) 73
22 attachments 589 disclosure (i) 18 named 68
 
In table 3 we noted that six words (in bold) were 
common to all columns and felt that these 6 words 
would be a logical choice for our first keywords.  We 
decided, also, that instances collocating within, 
approximately, one sentence of our target key word 
“confidential” could be of interest, but would assign 
less importance to those at a greater distance.  Since 15 
to 20 words is a good length for a sentence6, we 
expanded our window of consideration to 20, without 
consideration for sentence boundaries, and weighted 
each word inversely proportional to distance.  We 
considered only emails in the Enron corpus that 
contained ”confidential”.  A subset of this collection, 
based on the first 25 email account names in 
alphabetical order, was treated.  This collection was 
manually evaluated to determine whether the instances 
of “confidential” were in banners or body.  To ensure 
that these could be treated separately, and in lieu of 
external annotations, each banner instance was 
replaced with “zzzzzzzzzzial” (3223 in total) and each 
body instance with “xxxxxxxxxxxial” (2663 in total), 
effectively tagging each. 
We computed individual weights for all 
“confidential” key word instances in both banner and 
body. The resulting graph, figure (1) shows the error % 
(1-precision) against trigger weight for body and 
banner.  At a trigger level greater than 0.5, 46 from 
2663 instances (1.7%) false negatives would be 
generated, and 2737 false positives (84.9%) would now 
be correctly filtered. 
                                                        
6 http://www.plainenglish.co.uk/medicalguide.pdf  
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Figure 1 Error % against trigger weight 
 
These initial results were encouraging, however we 
needed a further assessment of the three key 
assumptions: (i) best distance – whether a 20 word 
window was a good choice; (ii) impact of weighting on 
precision; (iii) lexical selection – quality of the chosen 
word list. 
(i) We used max distance at values of 3, 5, 10, & 20 
and plotted the effects of max distance on precision see 
figure (2). For body instances, no significant change in 
precision resulted; for banners, reducing the max 
distance caused a reduction in precision. This indicated 
that the instance word list data in the surrounding area 
was relatively rare in the body case.  
(ii) We removed the discount for distance, and 
evaluated results at a maximum distance of 10 & 20.  
Results of the effects of max distance on precision can 
be seen in figure (3).  This showed that the attenuation 
was actually having a detrimental effect on body 
precision, and a beneficial effect on banner precision. 
However with such a small word instance list the 
granularity may be considered crude.  
 
.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2
trigger weight
banner max dist 20
Banner max dist 10
Banner max dist 5
Banner max dist 3
Body max dist 20
Body max dist 10
Body max dist 5
Body max dist 3
 
Figure 2 Error % against maximum distance 
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Figure 3 Error % against maximum distance 
 
(iii) We ran the experiment using the three different 
keyword sets of table 4 - see figure (4).  
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Figure 4 Error % against different word sets 
 
Surprisingly, the Proximity raw Corpus frequency 
set (all freq) out performed (banner freq), showing that 
there was a significant pattern coming from the 
banners in the raw Enron corpus. The most frequent 
banner set (banner freq) did reasonably well, but not as 
well as expected.  The most significant improvement 
came from the weird set (Banner weird), with 
exceedingly good results.  With a trigger level set to 
greater than 2, only 10 body confidential instances 
(0.37%) would be mis-categorized and not presented to 
a human for inspection and 2752 banners (85.4%) 
would be correctly filtered. For others to give good 
results for Body categorization required a trigger 
weight of 4, resulting in significantly worse banner 
discrimination characteristics.  Following this result we 
reexamined the statistics from the training corpus and 
produced a table in banner weirdness order against 
body frequency (Table 4). This demonstrated that the 
weirdest words were very, or exceedingly, rare in the 
body text. So the best way of choosing instance words 
for the banner filter was to use some function of banner 
weirdness and body rarity, for example techniques 
from [9], [10], [11] in a different orientation. 
 
Table 4: Body Freq/Banner Weirdness 
Body Word Banner Weirdness 
1 email 32 inf! 
0 dissemination 14 2793 
0 prohibited 29 2700 
0 attachments 19 2123 
0 sender 30 1581 
7 disclosure 18 1523 
0 recipient 46 1494 
0 delete 27 1178 
0 notify 27 1077 
5 mail 68 969 
0 copying 22 945 
8 privileged 32 798 
0 addressee 15 340 
1 intended 66 288 
0 error 28 245 
0 solely 12 229 
0 strictly 17 197 
1 contained 15 98 
0 contain 19 95 
2 copy 11 77 
0 contains 11 73 
0 named 13 68 
 
5. Related Work 
 
Work on the Enron corpus elsewhere has 
investigated automatic classification of emails as 
“Business” or “Personal” based on inter-annotator 
agreement [15].   The authors suggest that around 17% 
of a sample of around 12,500 emails were identified as 
personal correspondence, based on 94% agreement 
between 4 annotators, and a probabalistic classifier 
reportedly achieves good performance against a subset 
of these documents.  This work is directly related to 
Step 7 of our approach, and it will be interesting to 
measure the extent to which banners might act as 
useful classifiers for business emails. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we discussed the ease with which 
email can be used for breaches of confidence and the 
potential for harm to organizations as a result.  We 
identified a lack of literature regarding the problem of 
correctly identifying such potential breaches.  We have 
proposed an intelligent filtering system for outgoing 
emails aimed at preventing such disclosures, and 
demonstrated through a number of relatively 
straightforward, yet encouragingly effective 
experiments how the use of a few techniques from the 
field of Corpus Linguistics could be used to reduce the 
number of false alarms – false positives - produced by 
keyword filtering and considered the proportion of 
harmful false negatives.  These experiments were 
undertaken on the publicly accessible Enron email 
corpus.  These early results are highly promising, and 
work aimed at further improvements over these results 
is already in progress and will be reported when fully 
verified.   
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